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Abstract—There is an increasing security risk in Building
Automation Systems (BAS) in that its communication is unpro-
tected, resulting in the adversary having the capability to inject
spurious commands to the actuators to alter the behaviour of
BAS. The communication between the Human-Machine-Interface
(HMI) and the controller (PLC) is vulnerable as there is no
secret key being used to protect the authenticity, confidentiality
and integrity of the sensor data and commands. We propose
SEABASS, a lightweight key management scheme to distribute
and manage session keys between HMI and PLCs, providing a
secure communication channel between any two communicating
devices in BAS through a symmetric-key based hash-chain
encryption and authentication of message exchange. Our scheme
facilitates automatic renewal of session keys periodically based
on the use of a reversed hash-chain. A prototype was imple-
mented using the BACnet/IP communication protocol and the
preliminary results show that the symmetric keychain approach
is lightweight and incurs low latency.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Building Automation System (BAS) is a computerized,
intelligent system that controls and monitors Heating, Venti-
lation, Air conditioning (HVAC), lighting devices, fire alarm
systems, CCTV, access control systems, etc in a building. It is
gaining popular as it has the capability to reduce maintenance
cost and energy consumption, as well as to increase con-
trollability, reliability, and usability for maintenance staff and
tenants of the building. BAS can also be deployed in industrial
infrastructures such as malls, enterprise buildings and factories
[6] [16]. Typically, such a system performs supervisory control
and monitoring of field devices such as sensors, actuators
and controllers (Programmable logic controller (PLC), Remote
terminal unit (RTU) and Intelligent Electronic Device (IED)),
and this is realized through a Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) system. In the SCADA system, there is
a Human-Machine-Interface (HMI) that can be used to control
and visualize the field devices deployed in BAS. Therefore,
the maintenance staff is able to quickly detect problems and
subsequently perform the necessary adjustments.
Historically SCADA systems in industrial infrastructures
have been used for monitoring and controlling critical infras-
tructures and manufacturing process operated in isolated envi-
ronment. This forms an air gap, isolating the SCADA network
from the outside world, so that the data and control commands
remain secure inside the SCADA network. However, with the
advent of Internet, there are increasing number of SCADA
systems that are now connected to the outside world to allow
for better decision making for enterprises by providing them
with real-time remote updates at any time and any place.
As a result, there is a significant security risks and threats
to the SCADA networks that do not have sufficient security
protection by default.
First of all, the communication between the field devices
(i.e., sensors, PLCs, and Remote Terminal Units (RTU)) and
the Human-Machine-Interface (HMI) in SCADA network is
often unprotected. By using network sniffing tools, real time
data can be eavesdropped and observed by adversary in order
to understand the system behaviour. Active attacks could also
be launched by injecting spurious messages into the network,
altering the sensor data and commands issued to the actuators.
In addition, it is susceptible to Man-In-the-Middle (MITM)
and DoS attacks once the adversary gains access to the
network. As a result, the compromise of SCADA network
has a wider consequence that leads to losses of monies, lives,
production, assets and reputation of the company.
In this paper, we propose SEABASS, a symmetric-key
based key management scheme to distribute a session key
between devices in SCADA network, i.e., HMI-PLC, PLC-
PLC, or even PLC-Sensor, and to allow automatic renewal of
the session key periodically based on the use of a reversed
hash-chain and the authentication mechanism defined in Viot-
SOC [12]. Any devices in the network can be paired to obtain
a session key from the key management server, one acting
as the client, while the other as the server; We assume that
the devices use BACNet/IP as their communication medium
in this work. A security protocol is defined between the three
parties, namely the key management server, client and server
to distribute and renew the session key.
This paper is organised as follows: Section II discusses the
background of building automation system, the communica-
tion protocols used and related work. Section III presents the
threat model, security requirements and outline the proposed
key management scheme using lightweight hash-chain. Sec-
tion IV describes the prototype implementation based on an
environmental monitoring use case in a building, while Section
V discusses the performance results and analysis. We conclude
the paper with future work in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. SCADA System for BAS
A SCADA network consists of controller devices such as
RTUs, PLCs and IEDs interconnected with sensing equipments
and switch boxes or valve actuators spread in the process
field. The data from sensing equipments is collected by these
field devices and then sent to the MTU located at control
network. The communication link between controller devices
and the control network is typically by fibre cable, GPRS or
other wireless technologies. The SCADA server or data server
assembles the data, transfers alarms and events to the Human
Machine Interface (HMI) and archives the collected data in a
large database, called historian. The historian logs and archives
time-based process data to allow for auditing, performance
monitoring and trend analysis. The HMI provides an interface
for the operating engineer to get a system overview [8], [13].
Increasingly, the top layer corporate network provides re-
mote capabilities to allow for users to examine the state of the
SCADA system. Consequently, this connection has become
one of the main security concerns due to the exposure of
this isolated SCADA network to the Internet. With a wrong
configuration, anyone connected to the Internet can potentially
connect to the control network and then compromising it [8].
B. Communication Protocols
1) ModBus: Modicon Communication Bus (Modbus) con-
trol protocol is one of the oldest and widely used communi-
cation protocols in BAS due to its simplicity and reliability
[15]. Modbus was designed to allow for communication of
industrial equipments such as computers, sensors, PLCs and
other physical input/output devices over the IP/Ethernet net-
work. It is the standard for industrial SCADA systems and
uses Master/Slave protocol for data communication whereby a
Master Terminal Unit (MTU) polls data as master from several
slave devices like PLCs and IEDs, while supports data as slave
to other master devices like ICS server and HMIs [11] [18].
Modbus provides mechanisms for both unicast and multicast
transmissions between multiple MTUs and multiple RTUs.
It is also able to support numerous Building Automation
(BA) controllers, especially for HVAC controller-to-controller-
communication (e.g., with chillers). However, there is no mes-
sage verification checks that originated from legitimate devices
(lack of authentication). This means that any compromised
devices in Modbus network is able to manipulate and control
slave devices to perform malicious actions [11]. Furthermore,
anyone connected to the network can eavesdrop on the data
transmitted from local slaves.
2) BACnet: BACnet is a standard data communication pro-
tocol for Building Automation and Control Networks which
enables maximized interoperability across many products,
building systems, and vendors in commercial buildings [3].
BACnet was developed by ASHRAE and released in 1995
as ASHRAE standard 135 and ISO standard in 2003 [5],
[14]–[16]. It also supports IP network through BACNet/IP
in which each BACnet/IP device understands how to use IP
directly and constructs its own UDP message and sends it
via IP addressing to the desired destination device. BACnet/IP
uses UDP as its communication means and it heavily relies
on IP broadcasting messages to locate other BACnet devices
from separate subnets. BACnet suffers from spoofing, device
discovery attack and write-property attack (c.f. Section III-A)
3) DNP3: Distributed Network Protocol (DNP) was first
introduced in 1998 [10] as a serial protocol which is similar to
Modbus [11]. It was initially designed for the communication
between substation and their control station in an intercon-
nected SCADA network [17]. It uses a standard asynchronous
serial telecontrol channel (IEC 60870-5-101) and TCP/IP
network (IEC 60870-5-104 extension of IEC 60870-5-101).
DNP3 becomes standardized as IEEE 1815-2010 in 2010 and
is still widely used in various SCADA domains such as power
grids, waterways, and railways in North America and Asia [4].
DNP3 is widely used to interconnect RTU (control station) to
IED (substation) in electric substations [11]. Though Secure
DNP3 can be used to provide data integrity and authenticity,
it can be compromised fairly easily due to the small number
of well-defined function codes used in DNP messages.
4) LonWorks: LonWorks was developed by Echelon Cor-
poration in 1991 and is an open standard in control networks
[7] [19]. Each LonWorks device consists of a transceiver Chip
called Neuron chip that is embedded with a firmware called
LonTalk protocol, i.e., the communication protocol. LonTalk
protocol implements all seven layers of the Open System Inter-
connection (OSI) standard Model to serve as an open system
platform. LonWorks communicates via standard network vari-
able types (SNVT) to facilitate interoperability by providing a
well-defined interface. SNVT is similar to BACnet’s context-
driven based data types [2]. However, BACnet provides a
greater provision of high-end functions, such as scheduling,
alarm management, trending, etc whereas LonWorks seems to
be focusing on interoperability at device level. [20] reported
that the transmission of messages in LonTalk protocol is not
encrypted and the identity of the sender cannot be verified
when broadcasting messages.
III. OVERVIEW OF SEABASS
This section first outlines the threat model in Building
Automation Systems (BAS). Subsequently, we provide an
overview of the proposed symmetric-key based hash-chain key
management system to secure the communication in BAS.
A. Threat Model
• Message Spoofing and MITM Attack – As there is no
message verification checks whether a message originates
from a legitimate device in Modbus, an adversary can
easily spoof control messages in order to trigger abnormal
actions [11]. While in BACnet, an attack similar to ARP
spoofing can be launched where a compromised device
generates BACnet’s "I-Am-Router-To-Network" messages
with the fake content and forces other devices to send
their messages via the attacker host [1]. With this, MITM
Fig. 1: Proposed Key Distribution Scheme for BAS
attack be easily launched to manipulate the data ex-
changed in the network.
• WriteProperty Attack – Property of field devices repre-
sents the current state of the environment. In BACnet, an
adversary can manipulate the properties of the device by
performing a WriteProperty attack, causing the device to
switch on/off. Through changing the values in BACnet’s
object properties, the control and communications in the
network can be easily disrupted [9].
• Interception and Traffic Redirection – An adver-
sary can spoof "I-Am-Router-To-Network" or "Router-
Available-to-Network" messages, thus tricking the other
field devices into redirecting selective traffic messages
to itself. Consequently, the adversary will be able to
gain access to the traffic data and eavesdrops on the
confidential monitoring data [9].
B. Security Requirements
In this paper, we specifically address three security require-
ments in BAS as described below:
• Efficient Key Distribution – In order to enable device and
message encryption and authentication, BAS requires that
all devices in the system be provisioned with a symmetric
key in an efficient manner. As devices in BAS have scarce
computation resources, certificate based and public-key
approaches are not desirable.
• Automated and regular Key Renewal – One of the issues
in existing BACnet protocol is that the key server handles
too many keys to be distributed to field devices and
these keys are required to be periodically updated by
communicating with the key server. This implies that the
key server has to be available at all times to facilitate
key updates. An automated key management scheme is
required, and with a very frequent key renewal rate, key
revocation is not necessary.
• Lightweight Communication Security – There is a need
for proper message authentication and integrity protec-
tion. A symmetric-key based scheme should be used,
as public-key cryptography incurs high overheads if de-
ployed these constrained devices in BAS.
C. Overview of Key Management Scheme for BAS
The main objective of the proposed key management
scheme is to efficiently provision a secret communication key
between two communicating devices (i.e., HMI-PLC and PLC-
PLC) in BAS. Figure 1 shows that the key server is responsible
for distributing security keys and security parameters to PLCs
and HMI so that each PLC can establish a secure communi-
cation channel with the HMI. The communication between all
devices in BAS is assumed to be BACnet/IP, as it allows them
to discover other BACnet devices across different IP subnets
and forms a private communication between them.
The PLC obtains environmental readings through the sen-
sors and it can also trigger actions on actuators thus forming a
feedback-control loop. The environmental state of the building
can be visualized on HMI, thus enabling further optimization
and adaptation of the building’s energy consumption and oper-
ations. The proposed system is a generalized key management
scheme that is able to distribute and manage session keys to
enable HMI-PLC, PLC-sensor or PLC-PLC communication in
a secure manner through encryption and authentication.
1) Key Generation and Distribution: As shown in Figure
2, the Key Server generates three security parameters, namely
Passcode, Hash Key and Hint. The Passcode serves as a secret
communication key to be used between the two communicat-
ing devices. The Hash Key is formed using a hash-chain by
repeatedly applying a standard hash function such as SHA256
on a seed. This Hash Key is mapped to time and each time
slot is assigned a Hash Key and a Passcode. The passcode for
each time slot is encrypted with its corresponding Hash Key,
thus forming the Hint. The Hash Keys comprising a hash chain
are used in reversed order to provide fine-granular time-based
access to the sensor data.
• Passcode – Key Server randomly generates j numbers of
128-bit keys, P0 to Pj−1. j is a configurable parameter
for the number of time slots in a day.
• Hash Key – A hash-chain is generated using the relation
of Vi = H (Vi−1) where Vi is a Hash Key valid for time
slot i and H is a hash function, i.e., SHA-256. V0 is
computed by using a random seed value. For example,
the relation is based on V1 = H (Seed) → V2 = H (V1)
→ V3 = H (V2) ... Vi = H (Vi−1).
• Hint – Protects the Passcode by computing Hintk =
E(Pk)Vk , where Hintk is the hint valid for time slot k,
E is encryption of the Passcode, and V is a Hash Key.
For example, the first Hint for time slot 23:00 – 00:00
can be formulated as Hint0 = E (P0)V0 , and so on.
Similar to a client-server approach, the PLC which has the
sensor data, is denoted as the server, while the HMI which
accesses the sensor data from the PLC, is denoted as the
client. The Key Server distributes the Hint and the Passcode
to the PLC, while it sends a designated Hash Key to the HMI.
As shown in the example in Figure 2, the Hash Key V21 is
sent to HMI to allow for HMI to access the sensor data from
Fig. 2: Key Distribution Process
time slot 00:00 – 02:00. It will not be able to access sensor
data afterwards as it does not have the Hash Key to decrypt
the Passcodes for the subsequent time slots. The length of
each time slot is configurable and is determined by the key
distribution server.
2) Authentication & Key Agreement: After the keys and
security parameters have been distributed, the two commu-
nicating parties, i.e., the PLC and HMI must perform a key
agreement protocol in order to establish a secure communica-
tion channel between them. For each time slot, a Hash Key, V
has been allocated to the two communicating parties. The HMI
can send a request to the PLC that it wishes to communicate
with, in order to obtain the Hint. As HMI possesses the Hash
Key for that particular time slot, it can decrypt the Hint to
obtain the Passcode for the time slot. Authentication and key
agreement between the PLC and HMI are successful when the
Hint can be decrypted successfully.
As the Hint is encrypted with the Hash Key, and each time
slot has a different Hint, if a HMI was not provisioned with the
correct Hash Key, it will not be able to decrypt the Hint and
subsequently recover the Passcode. Consequently, the sensor
data recorded by the PLC will not be accessible to the HMI.
The Passcode is automatically renewed when the time slot has
expired. The HMI will need to request for a new Hint from
the PLC in order to obtain the new Passcode. The renewal of
Passcode does not require the Key Server to be available at
all times, as it only involves the two communicating parties
to relay the Hint.
D. Secure Communication Channel
Having both communicating parties agreed on the Passcode
for a particular time slot, the sensor data or the actuator com-
mand can be encrypted, integrity protected and authenticated.
The sensor data is encrypted with the Passcode using AES,
and a MAC can be generated using SHA256. In particular,
Passcode is used as the AES and MAC key for sensitive
values in each BACnet object (see Section IV). As the PLC
automatically changes the Passcode after the time slot has
expired, the HMI may fail to decrypt the sensor reading
Fig. 3: Environmental Setup of BAS Prototype
when the Passcode has expired. In this case, the HMI will
automatically request for the new Hint from the PLC in order
to decrypt the encrypted sensor reading.
IV. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION AND USE CASE
We have implemented a prototype to demonstrate the fea-
sibility and security of the proposed lightweight key manage-
ment scheme to secure the communications in BAS. Using
environmental sensing and monitoring in a building as a use
case, we deployed the prototype in an office space, to allow
for the gathering of temperature, humidity, lighting, noise and
air quality data and securely transmit them to the HMI.
As shown in Figure 3, the CubeSensors were used to
monitor room conditions. A Raspberry Pi was used to simulate
a PLC, gathering data from the CubeSensors. Sensor data
were recorded by the PLC periodically every minute. The
HMI obtains sensors data by communicating with the PLCs
(i.e., Raspberry Pi devices) deployed, so that the state of the
building can be visualized and appropriate control commands
can be issued according to context changes in the building in
a secure manner.
Each BACnet object represents the current status of a
device, which can be sent and shared with other devices in
the BACnet network. ANSI/ASHRAE 135-2016 specifies sixty
standard objects. In order to comply with the BACnet/IP object
standard, a new Security Object was defined to encapsulate the
security parameters, i.e., the Hash Key, Hint and Passcode.
The Security object contains three properties, namely Name,
Description, Ciphertext.
Security Object (ID)
Name : PLC-1-Passcodes
Description : Encrypted Passcodes
Ciphertext : A139efJsw...
Fig. 4: Example of a Security Object defined for BACnet/IP
As shown in Figure 4, the Key Server hosts a set of Security
Objects to distribute security parameters, allowing for PLCs
and HMI to retrieve their respective Security Objects from the
Key Server. Similarly, the PLCs also host a Security Object
encapsulating the Hint, to allow for the HMI to retrieve the
Passcode in every time slot.
As the communication protocol was BACnet/IP, each sensor
was configured as a BACnet Managed Object. In this case,
each PLC has a BACnet Managed Object to represent each
sensor it manages and the object contains many properties, in
particular it uses Present Value to indicate the sensor reading in
plaintext, which is not desirable in a security context. Instead,
using our proposed key distribution scheme, the sensor reading
can now be encrypted and integrity protected, by defining a
new property called EncryptedPresentValue in the Managed
Object. Whenever a new sensor reading is obtained by the
PLC, it encrypts the reading using the Passcode obtained from
the Key Server and place it in the EncryptedPresentValue prop-
erty. Subsequently, the HMI reads the EncryptedPresentValue
from the PLC and decrypts it if it is authorised.
In this prototype implementation, there were 24 time slots
defined for a day, where the Passcode was renewed on an
hourly basis. As a result, all the passcodes will be used up
after a day, and the key distribution server must distribute
fresh Hint, Passcode and Hash Key to the PLCs and HMI on a
daily basis. The duration of the time slot can be configured, for
applications which require critical monitoring, the key renewal
frequency can be increased, thus eliminating the need for key
revocation.
V. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
This section presents the evaluation and performance anal-
ysis of SEABASS.
A. Validation of Data Confidentiality
Wireshark was used to sniff the network traffic containing
BACnet messages. It is trivial that prior to the deployment of
the proposed scheme, the present value encoded in BACnet
Managed Object can be eavesdropped and accessed in clear,
thus revealing the sensor readings. With the deployment of our
scheme, Wireshark no longer had the capability to sniff out
the sensor readings, as they were encrypted by the respective
Passcode using AES.
B. Performance Results
1) Key Server: Hash Key Generation: The deployed Key
Server is responsible for generating Hash Key thus forming a
hash chain to be used between two communicating devices.
As there are many sensors and actuators in BAS, we evaluated
the timing performance for generating the hash chain as a
function of the number of paired devices. As shown in Table
I, we first used a Raspberry Pi 2 device to act as the Key
Server, and measured the time for generating a hash chain for
50, 500 and 5000 pairs of devices with varying frequencies
(number of time slots per day). Our results show that there
is no significant difference in terms of performance when
generating a hash-chain consisting of 24 or 48 Hash Keys.
However, when scaling the key renewal frequency to every
15 minutes, thus requiring 72 Hash Keys per pair of devices,
there was a significant latency. It is noteworthy that the key
generation process is taking place offline, and potentially can
be offloaded to a more powerful server.
TABLE I: Performance of Hash Key Generation on Raspberry
Pi 2
Generate Hashes
Number of pairs 50 500 5000
24 (Hourly) 2.8 s 15.7 s 231.6 s
48 (every 30 minutes) 3.7 s 20.0 s 264.2 s
72 (every 15 minutes) 4.0 s 26.1 s 742.2 s
It is also possible to partition the building by floor, to
have a distributed Key Server per floor to be responsible for
the generation of security parameters in order to enhance the
scalability of the system. One possible consequences is that
the system may end up having more attack surfaces, thus
it is important that these Key Servers generates the security
parameters offline and upon completion of the key distribution,
all the generated security parameters are deleted and the Key
Servers can be taken offline.
2) Key Server: Hint & Passcode Generation: Each Pass-
code is basically a random number, while the Hint is the
encryption of the Passcode with the designated Hash Key. On a
Raspberry Pi 2 device, the average time to generate a Passcode
was approximately 1 ms, and it took 5 – 7 ms to generate a
full set of 24 Passcodes.
As the for the Hint, the average time required to encrypt
a Passcode was 1 – 2 ms. Encrypting all the Passcodes for
a day, i.e., 24 time slots, took approximately 20 – 41 ms on
average. Similarly, the generation of Passcode and Hint can
be performed offline.
TABLE II: Summary of Performance Results
Device Tasks Average time
Key Server Security Parameters generation 45 – 97 ms
Client Decryption of sensor Reading 2.3 – 2.7 ms
Client Renewal of Passcode 15 – 20 ms
Sensor Encryption of Sensor Reading 6.5 – 10.5 ms
3) PLC: Encryption of Sensor Reading: Similar to the
encryption of Passcode, the sensor reading is encrypted using
the Passcode using AES. In the deployed system, two sensor
readings were obtained, namely temperature and humidity.
They were both encrypted separately, i.e., two encryption
operations. The average time to perform AES encryption was
approximately 6.5 – 10.5 ms on a Raspberry Pi 2.
4) HMI: Decryption of Sensor Reading: Decryption is
slightly faster as compared to encryption. In our experiment,
the average time to decrypt a sensor reading was between
2.3 – 2.7 ms. Note that for each time slot, in addition to the
decryption of sensor readings, the HMI is required to decrypt
the Hint obtained from the PLC in order to recover the Pass-
code to decrypt the sensor reading. Taking into consideration
network access time in the simulated environment, it took
approximately 15 – 20 ms to renew the Passcode after expiry.
VI. DISCUSSION
Our scheme assumes that the communication between the
key distribution server and PLC is protected by using a pre-
shared key stored in each PLC’s storage disk or ROM. If a
particular PLC’s pre-shared key is compromised, the human
administrator can re-provision a new pre-shared key into the
compromised PLC. Our paper’s proposed key distribution
scheme is orthogonal to that of a pre-shared key scheme:
the former protects the communication between HMIs and
PLCs, while the latter protects communication between the
key distribution server and PLCs. The reason we do not use
pre-shared keys for communication between HMIs and PLCs
is because we assume key distribution servers are more robust
and have a smaller attack surface than HMIs. If HMIs use
pre-shared keys with PLCs and one HMI gets compromised,
the human needs to manually change the pre-shared keys of
all PLCs that was shared with the compromised HMI.
Meanwhile, using our key management scheme, a com-
promised HMI’s passcode will be automatically expired after
a certain period of time. During this period, PLCs should
not provide data to this compromised HMI. One form of
revocation that is similar to CRL can be employed, the key dis-
tribution server can distribute compromised Passcodes or Hash
Keys to the PLCs and HMIs, in order to invalidate messages
encrypted with the compromised Passcodes. Alternatively, a
tree-based revocation scheme as described in [12] can be
used, in which each server is responsible for maintaining a
revocation tree to invalidate Passcodes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has provided a first attempt to deploy key dis-
tribution and management for Building Automation Systems,
which in turn provides confidentiality and authenticity to sen-
sor reading and commands in a building management scenario.
The novelty of SEABASS is that it is symmetric-key based,
and hence lightweight compared to public-key based approach.
The session keys to protect the communications in BAS are
automatically and regularly renewed without requiring the Key
Server to be available all the time.
We implemented and deployed SEABASS using Rasp-
berry Pi 2 to simulate a SCADA environment. The preliminary
results look promising and we observed that the proposed
system is fully deployable.
As a future work, we plan to further refine the solution
based on real industry requirements and deploy SEABASS
on real PLCs or OpenPLCs in order to further validate the
security, performance and reliability of the solution.
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